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The Statute of Frauds 
Roger Bernhardt 
Sterling v Taylor (2007) 40 C4th 757, 55 CR3d 116, reported in 30 CEB RPLR 54 (Mar. 
2007), was a supreme court decision reported in our last issue, but it came too close to our 
publication date to allow time for me to comment on it i  that issue. Now that there is time, I do 
not think that there is any constructive way for attorneys to correct their practices based on this 
decision. 
Essentially, Sterling wrote out a handwritten memorandum of her deal with Taylor for her to 
buy some of his properties for “approx 10.468 X gross income [,] estimated income 1.600.000, 
Price $16,750.00,” and Taylor later signed another pi ce of paper acknowledging some of that. 
When Sterling later discovered that actual income from the properties was only $1,375,404 (not 
$1,600,000), she thought she should have to pay 10.468 times that, or $14,404,841, whereas 
Taylor believed she should pay $16,750,000. Sterling sued for specific performance, but the trial 
court rendered summary judgment against her on the ground that the memorandum did not state 
the price clearly enough to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The court of appeal reversed, holding 
that extrinsic evidence could be admitted to clarify the price and satisfy the statute, but then the 
supreme court reversed the court of appeal and affirmed the trial court. In doing so, the high 
court unanimously said that it agreed with the interm diate court about the propriety of extrinsic 
evidence being used to enable an ambiguous memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, but 
then five justices went on to say “but not in this case.” Sterling’s extrinsic evidence was offered 
to support a $14.4 million price, which was nowhere in the contract, and did not support, for 
Statute of Frauds purposes, the $16.7 million price that was in the contract, a position that caused 
two of the justices to dissent to that conclusion and want to leave it for the trier of fact—rather 
than the supreme court—to decide. 
I don’t want to look like I’m siding with the minority, but the problem I have with Justice 
Corrigan’s majority opinion is that it does not give any guidance to attorneys who are attempting 
to intelligently predict to their clients the sufficiency of the writings that they have generated. An 
attorney lucky enough to draft the agreement herself can naturally be expected to assure that the 
documents she produces will not only correctly exprss the terms of the deal, but will also satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds; so, too, when the memorandum sketched out by the clients themselves is 
given to her to critique or formalize. But if the fight has already started and the memorandum is 
all there is, and she needs to be able to tell the prospective plaintiff with some confidence 
whether to sue or give up (or to advise the defendant whether to fight or settle) based on that 
memorandum, then I fear that she will get no help from this decision. If the supreme court 
thought it was doing the bar a favor by giving it some guidance, I think it failed. 
Some lesser parts of the decision will help practitioners. The holding that extrinsic evidence 
will be admitted to bolster the claim that the Statu e of Frauds has been met is meaningful; an 
attorney no longer has to tell a plaintiff to abando  his claim because the document alone does 
not say enough, if there is enough additional supporting evidence to fill the gaps. Additionally, it 
is helpful to know that street addresses are good en ugh to satisfy the statute’s requirement for 
specificity of subject matter (although I suspect that no one ever really doubted that point). 
Another aspect of the case that looked like it would have been a more serious Statute of Frauds 
question was that Taylor never signed the memorandum as the party to be charged. He did sign 
and send a letter 2 days later, but that letter contained no price term (and Taylor disputed that the 
earlier memorandum was attached to it); he also signed escrow instructions that showed a price 
of $16.7 million. I wish the court had explained how that took care of the absence of his 
signature on the memorandum. 
But what takes the helpfulness away is the majority’s final point that this extrinsic evidence—
testimony that the formula was the real deal and the estimate only an estimate—would not satisfy 
the statute because the memorandum contained only the estimated number and not the 
formulaically derived one. The dissenters’ objection—that the formula was as much included in 
the memorandum as was the estimate—sounds equally correct to me, but more important is the 
fact that the majority makes it so much harder for a practitioner to predict whether his or her 
client has a case. Under this new standard, when the writing alone is not sufficient, we must not 
only decide whether there is enough supporting evidence to get past the Statute of Frauds, but 
also whether that supporting evidence is sufficiently consistent with the writing—which is, by 
itself, admittedly ambiguous. 
For instance, had Sterling come to me at the outset, I would have predicted that the writing 
seemed to give greater support to her formula (“10.468 X gross income”), worked out to 3 
decimal places, than for Taylor’s number (“Price $16,750.00”), a clearly rounded out figure with 
its three (rather than four) zeros at the end and no ecimals, especially in light of the “approx” 
and “estimated” in the notes. If I had the luxury of choosing my client on this issue, I would have 
taken Sterling over Taylor, which would have been a bad call in light of what the majority said. 
(I should note that my conclusion also happens to be ne that none of the justices took, perhaps 
another argument for requiring that the writing fill in the gaps in favor of one side of the 
dispute.) 
Luckily, we aren’t asked too often whether incomplete writings satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
While that issue now confronts more uncertainty than before, I daresay the bar will survive. 
 
